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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 UNVIE VIENNA 000493

SIPDIS

S/SANAC FOR EINHORN, NSC FOR RYU, TALWAR

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [IR](#)

SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: SOUTH AFRICA,S MINTY SUGGESTS LEANING  
ON NAM TO HEM IN IRAN

Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies for reasons 1.4 (c) and (e)

11. (S) On October 15, South African IAEA Board Governor Abdul Minty shared his opinions on Iranian nuclear strategy with MsnOff. On the proposal to fuel the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), Minty commented that it will be good if Iran's LEU "goes away," so he is supportive of the TRR deal as he understands it. He recommended that the U.S. capitalize on the deal by trying to get NAM members to "endorse" it, although he did not believe that full NAM endorsement would be possible given the "difficult" NAM troika of Cuba, Iran, and Egypt. Minty also suggested using key NAM states to further entrench what could then be called a precedent of limiting Iranian enrichment to five percent. Those states could engage Iran on the point privately, telling Iran that they are pleased that Iran has chosen to cap its enrichment at that level and calling it a good, positive signal. Iran might find it more difficult to backtrack if a norm has been created by its actions and is then expected among a usually supportive group of states.

12. (S) In response to MsnOff's question about whether Minty was surprised that President Ahmadinejad had said publicly in mid-October that Iran would ship its LEU to Russia for further enrichment, Minty said that he was not and recalled Iran's interest in the 2004 timeframe in shipping its UF6 to South Africa for storage, to increase confidence that its nuclear activities were peaceful in nature. Shipping out its LEU was not inconsistent with this earlier Iranian strategy, Minty said. Despite Iran's obvious interest in using this as a confidence-building measure, Minty noted that this act alone told us nothing about the nature of Iran's nuclear program. If Iran has a covert program, it would be happy to ship out its declared LEU to improve confidence. If it does not have a covert program, then it is also an important confidence-building measure with the added benefit of taking away the option from those who want nuclear weapons. Minty thought that the idea of Iran using its own LEU in the TRR was quite positive.

13. (S) On the Qom enrichment facility, Minty said that Iran had made a large mistake by not disclosing it early. Whatever Iran's motivations for building this facility, he opined, it will be important to go and inspect the facility, but Minty predicted that Iran would set up a number of hurdles to comprehensive inspections and access, not the least of which was the fact that the facility is on a military base. He agreed that the last DG's report on Syria, which noted that there is no barrier to inspecting military facilities, would be helpful in pressing Iran for access. Minty said that it was clear to him that Iran was trying to "beat the U.S. to the punch" in declaring the facility when it did. He also recommended that the U.S. not "make a big deal" about the clear violation of Code 3.1 modified, but then tempered to say that it would be appropriate--and perhaps even necessary--to call attention to Code 3.1 in the Board room, although it would not make a useful public

argument.

¶4. (S) Minty further pressed his recommendations about utilizing NAM states for creating additional pressure on Iran and argued that the U.S. should be asking other countries--he cited the Philippines, India, and Chile--to make stronger Iran statements in the Board room, again noting that South Africa cannot stand alone among the NAM in doing so. He noted that when he made such a plea with other Board members, it was successful in strengthening their statements. If the U.S. does lean on these countries, he asked that the USG let him know. Without letting on that he was informed by the U.S. of the push, he would follow up by making similar requests and asking these states to be more forceful in NAM meetings. He would directly request that they send ambassadors rather than lower-level officials to the meetings so that stronger and "more rational" statements could be made and the dynamic could be changed.

¶5. (S) In general, Minty remarked, the U.S. should be giving a variety of states roles to help follow up on the positive meetings on October 1 between the P5-plus-1 and Iran. Especially important are Turkey, Brazil, and India, all of whom could impress key points on Iran. He noted that South Africa would continue to try to be helpful, but repeated his familiar refrain that South Africa cannot continue to be the only NAM member that the U.S. relies upon for such messages with Iran. Minty also suggested that other Muslim countries could help to hem in Iran on issues of nuclear weapons by pressing Iran on its declaration of a fatwa against nuclear weapons. If other countries told Tehran that they are interested in the fatwa and developing it as a Muslim

UNVIE VIEN 00000493 002 OF 002

principle and that this could contribute to world peace, it might "change the norm" and be more difficult for Iran later to build nuclear weapons.

¶6. (S) Minty also expressed thanks for U.S. statements on the NPT in New York (NFI), calling them helpful even though the EU took a hard line, and suggested that there be interim meetings (possibly in Europe) that would bring S/SANAC or other appropriate officials to follow up on the U.S. position and create positive movement moving into the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

DAVIES